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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Securities fraud poses a major threat to the financial security of 
millions of investors.  Stock fraud and the brokerage firms perpetrating 
it thrive, bilking investors out of millions of dollars annually.  The North 
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), an association 
comprised of state and regional securities regulators, estimates that 
investors lose $6 billion a year to investment fraud, including micro-cap 
stock fraud.1  In 2000, Bradley Skolnick, the Indiana Securities 
Commissioner and former head of the NASAA, stated that boiler rooms 
were “the single greatest source of investment scams.”2  Yet defrauded 
investors are unlikely to recover funds lost to fraud, because these firms 
rarely operate with adequate reserves to pay settlements or awards.3  
Furthermore, the firms, their principals, and their brokers typically 
declare bankruptcy to avoid liability.4 
Under these circumstances, it comes as no surprise that investors 
attempt to recover from the larger clearing firms that process trades for 
these smaller broker-dealers; often there is no one else to go to.  In 
addition, the clearing firms play an important role in the fraud.  The New 
 
 1. California Department of Corporations, Micro-Cap Fraud, at http://www.corp. 
ca.gov/pub/microcap.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).  Micro-cap stocks are typically 
shares of companies that are not well established and have only a small amount of shares 
in public hands.  Id.  Firms perpetrating micro-cap stock fraud are often referred to as 
“boiler rooms” or “bucket shops.”  JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, 
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 58 (5th ed. 1998). 
 2. Ken Berzof, Unscrupulous ‘Boiler Rooms’ Aim to Burn the Investor, COURIER-
J. (Louisville), Feb. 28, 2000, at C1. 
 3. See N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN. BUREAU OF INVESTOR PROT. & SEC., REPORT ON 
MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD 15–16 (1997) [hereinafter REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK 
FRAUD]. 
 4. See id. 
  Problem brokers have been likened to cockroaches, because when the 
lights are turned on by regulators, the brokers scatter and regroup somewhere 
else. . . . 
  . . . [E]ven if . . . an award is made against a broker, the broker often gets 
the award discharged by filing for personally (sic) bankruptcy.  Even if the 
award remains unpaid it is not a debarring circumstance for NASD licensure. 
Id.  Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) insurance coverage does not provide 
very much, if any, protection for investors.  See Albert B. Crenshaw, Group Assails 
Insurer of Investors, WASH. POST, July 21, 1999, at E1; Gretchen Morgenson, U.S. 
Report Faults Agency that Oversees Investor Claims, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2001, at C1.  
Note that this problem has been ameliorated by the passage of the Corporate and 
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, which makes debts incurred in violation of 
securities laws nondischargeable in bankruptcy.  Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 803, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified at 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)).   
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York Attorney General’s Office stated: 
 Many of these firms use big-name clearing houses to carry out their 
activities.  The clearing firms’ policies and procedures regarding these smaller 
firms’ practices frequently amount to a blind eye, or worse. . . . 
 Micro-cap brokerage firms can only exist by processing their transactions 
through the road provided by the clearing firms. Existing regulatory “speed 
bumps” to prevent fraud have proven ineffective.  It is time to re-examine the 
responsibilities and obligations of clearing firms in light of the widespread fraud 
involved in the telemarketing of low-priced stocks.5 
In the past, investors typically lost these cases.  Clearing firms argued 
successfully that even had they had actual knowledge of the fraud being 
perpetrated by the brokerage firm, they had no duty to do anything about 
it.6  Recently, however, the tides have started to turn for investors 
attempting to hold clearing firms liable for the fraud of an introducing 
firm.  A recent National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 
arbitration award has provoked controversy by finding secondary 
liability for the clearing firm Hanifen, Imhoff Clearing Corporation (now 
known as Fiserv Correspondent Services) for the fraud of the brokerage 
firm Duke & Company, under the state securities laws of California and 
Washington.7  A federal district court in Oregon upheld the award, and 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal.8  The antifraud section of the 
Washington statute is modeled on the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 
(Uniform Act),9 currently adopted in thirty-four states.10  This Comment 
 
 5. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 3. 
 6. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has brought successful 
enforcement actions against clearing firms; most notably, against Bear, Stearns in 1999, 
related to Bear, Stearns’s clearing activities for A.R. Baron.  See generally Bear, Stearns 
Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 41,707, 70 SEC No. 710 (Aug. 5, 1999).  A.R. 
Baron engaged in widespread micro-cap stock fraud from 1992 to 1996.  Id. at 712–14.  
The firm declared bankruptcy in 1996, shortly after the SEC issued a cease and desist 
order.  Id. at 711 & n.2.  The firm and many of its officers and employees were indicted 
for fraud, and most pled guilty to grand larceny and enterprise corruption.  Id. at 712. 
 7. See Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2, 
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.).  For a discussion of the controversy, see 
John A. Byrne, Another Regulatory Landmine for Traders, TRADERS MAG., March 1, 
2001, 2001 WL 9059572; and Gretchen Morgenson, Striking a Blow for the Little Guy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, § 3, at 1. 
 8. Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001), 
aff’d, No. 01-35295, 2002 WL 530548 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2002) (unpublished opinion). 
 9. See I LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 42 n.39, 74 
n.114 (3d ed. 1998). 
 10. Id. at 42.  A number of the states that have not adopted the Uniform Act have 
adopted antifraud provisions that are either similar to or broader than those portions of 
the Uniform Act.  Id. at 73–76 & nn.114–16.  Although California securities laws are not 
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argues that secondary liability under state blue sky laws that are modeled 
on the Uniform Act provides a viable theory under which clearing firms 
may be liable to investors for the fraud of an introducing firm.11 
Part II of this Comment defines and describes the relationship between 
introducing and clearing firms, outlines the role of the clearing firm in 
the perpetuation of micro-cap stock fraud, and identifies arguments in 
favor of extending liability to clearing firms under some circumstances.  
Part III explains the impact of arbitration on securities fraud claims and 
illustrates the effect of recent arbitration awards holding clearing firms 
liable for the fraud of introducing firms.  Part IV discusses existing 
federal law regarding secondary liability for clearing firms.  Part V 
presents an analysis of the secondary liability provisions of the Uniform 
Act as they may be applied to clearing firms. 
II.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTRODUCING FIRMS AND             
CLEARING FIRMS 
A.  Definitions and Roles 
An “introducing firm” or “introducing broker” is a brokerage firm that 
deals directly with the public and originates customer accounts.12  The 
introducing firm is engaged in the business of soliciting or receiving 
orders for transactions from customers and is the primary point of 
contact for the customer.  Many introducing firms are small, with little 
in the way of capital.13  Smaller firms are usually unable to process their 
own transactions from beginning to end due to the high costs involved.14  
They may not possess the expertise or technology necessary to process 
every aspect of a transaction.15  As a result, introducing firms contract 
with clearing firms to do this work for them. 
A “clearing firm” (also known as a “carrying broker” or “carrying 
firm”)16 is usually a large, well-capitalized brokerage firm that provides 
 
based on the Uniform Act, many of the fraud provisions are similar.  Id. at 83–86. 
 11. This Comment will refer to the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, because the 
1985 Act has not been adopted by many states.  Id. at 42.  The antifraud provisions of the 
1985 Act are nearly identical, however.  Id. at 71 n.108. 
 12. See Henry F. Minnerop, The Role and Regulation of Clearing Brokers, 48 BUS. 
LAW. 841, 841–43 (1993); see also William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. Carman, An 
Analysis of the Business and Legal Relationship Between Introducing and Carrying 
Brokers, 40 BUS. LAW. 47, 47 n.2 (1984) (providing a discussion of these terms, which 
are not explicitly defined in the regulations). 
 13. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 842–43. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Clearing firms “carry” the accounts of introducing firms.  See Net Capital 
Requirements for Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2002). 
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a wide variety of services to the introducing firm.17  These services can 
include: 
the maintenance of books and records; the receipt, custody, and delivery of 
customer securities and funds; the extension of credit to finance customer 
transactions in margin accounts; and . . . the execution of transactions on 
exchanges or on the over-the-counter markets.  Most important, clearing firms 
“clear” transactions—paying for securities purchased and delivering securities 
sold in the accounts introduced to them . . . .18 
The relationship between clearing firms and introducing firms is 
governed by contract, within the parameters set by the regulatory 
agencies.19  The most common type of clearing agreement is the “fully 
disclosed” agreement.20  In this type of agreement, the clearing firm 
sends out trade confirmation slips and statements directly to customers, 
whose names and addresses are disclosed to the clearing firm.21  
Customers are informed of the existence of the clearing firm, the 
clearing agreement, and the relative roles and responsibilities of the 
clearing and introducing firms.22 
One of the most important functions played by clearing firms relates 
to the extension of credit.  In most cases, the clearing firm commits to 
pay for purchases and to deliver securities for the introducing firm.  If a 
customer does not pay for securities by the settlement date of the 
transaction, the clearing firm must provide the funds to pay for the 
trades.23  The clearing agreement generally makes payment the 
responsibility of the introducing firm.24  As a result, the clearing firm 
often extends credit to the introducing firm, which consequently 
“becomes a debtor of the clearing firm.”25  The clearing firm must gain 
 
 17. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 841, 844. 
 18. Id. at 841. 
 19. For a discussion of clearing agreements, see Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 
12, at 47–52. 
 20. Minnerop, supra note 12, at 843.  Other types of clearing agreements include 
“omnibus” agreements, where the clearing firm and the customers of the introducing 
firms have no knowledge of each others’ identities, and “professional” clearing 
agreements, which do not involve public customers.  Id. at 843 & n.7. 
 21. Id. at 843. 
 22. See id.  These responsibilities are identified in NYSE Rule 382(b).  NYSE 
CONSTITUTION AND RULES, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2382 (Aug. 31, 1999). 
 23. See NAT’L SEC. CLEARING CORP., RULES AND PROCEDURES, Rule 2, § 1, at 13 (Aug. 1, 
2002), http://www.nscc.com/legal/nsccrules.pdf; see also Minnerop, supra note 12, at 844–45. 
 24. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 845. 
 25. Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 41,707, 70 SEC No. 710, 
715 (Aug. 5, 1999). 
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the approval of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or NASD to 
extend credit,26 and must keep records regarding the extension of credit.  
This includes, in the case of the NYSE, sending monthly reports of 
introducing firms whose requested settlement extensions exceed two 
percent of those firms’ monthly transactions.27 
B.  The Growth of Clearing as a Business 
The growth of clearing has its basis in a few significant rule changes.28  
In 1982, the SEC approved the NYSE rule changes that allowed clearing 
firms to allocate supervisory functions to introducing firms in the 
clearing agreement.29  This rule change allowed clearing firms to assign 
supervisory responsibility to the introducing firms regarding compliance of 
their representatives with securities regulations.30  The clearing agreement 
delineating the responsibilities of each of the parties must be filed with 
and approved by the NYSE.31  The growth of the clearing business since 
1982 has been attributed in large part to this rule change; clearing 
became easier and cheaper, because it now involved less risk to the 
clearing broker.32 
Another development that impacted the growth of the clearing 
business was the introduction in 1975 of a lenient uniform net capital 
rule.33  The net capital rule specified the amount of cash reserves a firm 
 
 26. The NYSE and NASD are self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that govern 
their member firms.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) must approve all 
NYSE and NASD rule changes and can suggest additional rule changes to the SROs.  
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b)–(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)–(c) (2000).  See 
generally VI LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 2715–32 (3d ed., rev. 2002) (discussing 
the rulemaking relationships between these organizations). 
 27. See NYSE Info. Memo No. 94–22, at 2 (June 10, 1994), available at 1994 
NYSE Info. Memo LEXIS 51; NYSE Interp. Memo No. 97-4 (Aug. 28, 1997), 1997 
NYSE Interp. Memo LEXIS 7, at *133. 
 28. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 846–51, for a discussion of this issue. 
 29. Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 
18,497, 47 Fed. Reg. 8284 (Feb. 25, 1982).  For a discussion of the 1982 changes to 
NYSE Rules 382 and 405, see also NYSE Info. Memo No. 82–18 (Mar. 5, 1982), available 
at 1982 NYSE Info. Memo LEXIS 57; and Minnerop, supra note 12, at 848–50. 
 30. See Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release 
No. 18,497, 47 Fed. Reg. at 8284.  This rule change does not eliminate all liability from 
clearing firms, however.  See Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., 710 SEC at 715 (Aug. 5, 1999) 
(“[N]o contractual arrangement for the allocation of functions between an introducing 
and carrying organization can operate to relieve either organization from their respective 
responsibilities under the federal securities laws and applicable SRO rules.” (quoting 
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 18,497, 42 Fed. 
Reg. at 8284 n.2)). 
 31. NYSE CONSTITUTION AND RULES, Rule 382(a), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 
2382 (Aug. 31, 1999). 
 32. Minnerop, supra note 12, at 846. 
 33. Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2002). 
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must have in order to engage in the securities business.  Before the 1975 
rule, each exchange set its own requirements, which were comparatively 
quite high.  These exchange rules posed a substantial barrier to entry into 
securities markets.  In 1975, the SEC set new net capital requirements at 
only $5000 for introducing firms that cleared through clearing firms 
with adequate capital on a fully disclosed basis.34  Net capital 
requirements have since been increased to $100,000 for most 
introducing firms,35 but even with these increases, the minimums are not 
difficult to meet.  As a result of these lenient requirements, smaller firms 
are able to participate in the securities business as long as they clear their 
trades through an adequately capitalized clearing firm.  The growth of 
the clearing business has been attributed to the easy entry into the market 
provided by lenient net capital requirements.36 
Clearing has become a serious business.  The number of introducing 
firms utilizing a clearing firm has grown from 564 in 1975 to 5030 in 
2000,37 and that number is expected to increase.38  It is estimated that 
eighty-five percent of brokerage firms are introducing firms that utilize 
the services of a clearing firm.39  Smaller, thinly capitalized firms are 
able to enter the market, utilizing the services of larger, well-capitalized 
clearing firms. 
C.  Clearing Firms and Micro-Cap Stock Fraud 
1.  Financial Responsibility 
One sign of stock fraud that is readily apparent to clearing firms is the 
illegal behavior that introducing firms undertake in order to meet net 
capital requirements.  As discussed above, the net capital requirement is 
$100,000 for most introducing firms of the type involved in micro-cap 
 
 34. Id.; see also Minnerop, supra note 12, at 847–48. 
 35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2).  The exact amount varies depending on the type 
of firm.  The $100,000 requirement is for firms that clear customer transactions through 
another dealer (a clearing firm) but engage in market making activities of over-the-
counter (OTC) stocks; this applies to most introducing firms engaging in this type of 
micro-cap stock fraud.  Id. 
 36. Minnerop, supra note 12, at 846–48. 
 37. Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 5–6, Koruga v. 
Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-1415 MA) 
(citing Henry F. Minnerop, Recent Developments in the Regulation of Clearing Brokers, 
1 J. INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 27, 32  (2000)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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stock fraud,40 and includes limits on the amount any particular security 
can count toward meeting the requirements.41  If a firm has a substantial 
concentration of a few securities, which is commonly the case with firms 
involved in micro-cap stock fraud, it must heavily discount the value of 
those securities when calculating its net capital.42 
Introducing firms engaging in fraud utilize a number of strategies 
designed to work around the over-concentration requirements.  The 
strategies generally involve temporarily converting securities to cash for 
the purpose of meeting the requirements.  For example, introducing 
firms utilize a practice known as “parking.”43  To reduce the net capital 
requirements it would otherwise be subject to, the introducing firm 
executes a number of transactions every night, usually just before the 
markets close.  The firm parks the securities in a third party’s accounts, 
then moves the shares back to the firm’s proprietary account the next 
morning.  Another strategy is to execute unauthorized sales in customer 
accounts.44  When the customer complains, the firm may buy the shares 
back, keep them in the customer’s account despite the complaint, or sell 
them to another customer—with or without authorization.45 
In addition, clearing firms often become aware of fraud through 
activities connected with the extension of credit.46  As noted above, 
clearing firms are responsible for paying for purchases and delivering 
securities for the introducing firm.  Customers often refuse to pay for 
these unauthorized trades.47  The clearing firm must then either get 
approval from the introducing firm to cancel the trade or request a credit 
extension from the NYSE or the NASD.48 
Clearing firms are required to keep records documenting credit extension 
 
 40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(iii); see supra note 35. 
 41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(M). 
 42. Id. 
 43. The SEC described parking as follows: 
  “Parking” refers to the practice of concealing stock ownership by placing 
the stock in the account of a third party, while secretly retaining the obligation 
to repurchase that stock at a future date.  While persons may park stock for a 
variety of reasons[,] Baron parked stock to maintain the appearance of 
compliance with the Commission’s net capital rules. . . .  Because the 
securities in its proprietary accounts were exclusively house stocks, for which, 
in calculating net capital, a substantial haircut was required[,] Baron had a 
strong incentive to park those stocks before calculating net capital. 
Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 41,707, 70 SEC No. 710, 714 n.6 
(Aug. 5, 1999). 
 44. REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 39–40. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 82–85. 
 47. Id. at 82. 
 48. NYSE Info. Memo No. 94–22, at 2 (June 10, 1994), available at 1994 NYSE 
Info. Memo LEXIS 51; NYSE Interp. Memo No. 97-4 (Aug. 28, 1997), 1997 NYSE 
Interp. Memo LEXIS 7, at *133. 
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requests.49  Repeated problems with unpaid purchases and canceled 
transactions suggest underlying fraud.50  If the introducing firm goes 
under, the clearing firm is still obligated to make good on transactions and 
can incur substantial liability for trades for which the introducing firm has 
failed to pay.51  As a result, the clearing firm has an interest in obtaining 
approval for extensions and prohibiting unauthorized trades. 
Clearing firms often become aware of an introducing firm’s fraud in 
connection with activities related to these financial responsibility 
standards.52  Clearing firms that continue to allow introducing firms to 
operate after becoming aware of this behavior are important components 
of the fraudulent activity.53  In the case of A.R. Baron, for example, the 
SEC found that Bear, Stearns had knowingly aided the introducing firm 
in its violation of the net capital requirements.54  The SEC determined 
that Bear, Stearns knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that A.R. Baron 
engaged in unauthorized trading and parking of securities.55  By 
continuing to clear trades for A.R. Baron, Bear, Stearns aided and 
abetted the violation of these requirements.56 
2.  Customer Complaints 
Clearing firms may also become aware of the introducing firm’s fraud 
through customer complaints.  Customers often send complaints directly 
to clearing firms, especially after calls to their broker and the introducing 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 85. 
 51. See NAT’L SEC. CLEARING CORP., supra note 23, Rule 2, § 1, at 13. 
 52. See, e.g., Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 41,707, 70 SEC 
No. 710, 718 (Aug. 5, 1999) (“[C]lassic indications” of unauthorized trading and parking 
include “a high incidence of failures to pay for trades, excessive trade cancellations, 
corrections and credit extensions, numerous customer complaints against Baron and a 
pattern of stock being sold to customers from Baron’s inventory and then purchased back 
into the inventory by Baron close to settlement at a loss.”); see also REPORT ON MICRO-
CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 84–85. 
 53. REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 74 (“In the world of 
levitating house stocks a clearing broker that will extend credit and execute trades when 
a micro-cap brokerage firm has no capital is a great ally.”). 
 54. Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., 710 SEC at 726–27. 
 55. Id. 
 56. There is no private right of action for aiding and abetting under federal 
securities laws.  See discussion infra Part III.  The SEC can bring these actions, however, 
as a result of 1995 legislation amending section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.  See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, §104, 
109 Stat. 757 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000)). 
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firm prove ineffective.57  In 1999, the SEC approved amendments to 
NYSE Rule 382 and NASD Rule 3230 that increase the responsibilities 
of clearing firms regarding the reporting of customer complaints.58  Prior 
to the amendments, the clearing firm often ignored customer complaints, 
referring the customer back to the introducing firm.59  Clearing firms 
even ignored customer requests to halt all trading in their accounts as a 
result of unauthorized trading.60  The new rules require the clearing firm 
to send customer complaints both to the introducing firm and to the 
appropriate self-regulatory organization (SRO) as well as notify the 
customer in writing that the complaint has been submitted to these 
parties.61 
3.  History of Illegal or Suspicious Activity 
Many clearing firms have reason to believe that an introducing firm 
may perpetrate micro-cap stock fraud before the firm even opens its 
doors; performing due diligence on an introducing firm before beginning 
a clearing relationship, a common industry practice, can uncover a 
history of illegal activity by the principals or brokers.62  Firms like 
Merrill Lynch regularly look into the prior practices, disciplinary 
history, and regulatory actions of a firm and its principals and brokers 
prior to entering into a clearing agreement.63  This type of due diligence 
often uncovers indications that a firm may engage in fraudulent 
behavior.64  For example, an Oregon arbitration panel found that the 
clearing firm Hanifen, Imhoff Clearing Corporation (Hanifen) had actual 
knowledge that the principals and salespeople of Duke & Company had 
been involved in fraudulent activities while at the firm Stratton 
Oakmont.65 
 
 57. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 71–72. 
 58. See Clearing Agreements, Exchange Act Release No. 34-41468, 64 Fed. Reg. 
31,024, at 31,025 (June 2, 1999) (approving NASD rule changes); Carrying Agreements, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-41464, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,338 (June 2, 1999) (approving 
NYSE rule changes). 
 59. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 71–72. 
 60. See id. 
 61. NYSE CONSTITUTION AND RULES, Rule 382(a), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 
2382 (Aug. 31, 1999).  NYSE member firms are subject to the guidelines provided by 
the NYSE.  NASD member firms are subject to NASD rules. 
 62. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 78–80. 
 63. See id. at 78. 
 64. See id. at 79. 
 65. Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559, at *9 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2, 
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.).  Stratton Oakmont was permanently expelled 
from the securities industry in 1996 after engaging in widespread micro-cap stock fraud for 
many years.  Dist. Bus. Conduct Comm. for Dist. No. 10 v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 
Complaint No. C10950081, 1996 NASD Discip. LEXIS 52, at *55 (N.A.S.D. Dec. 5, 1996). 
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D.  Why Clearing Firms Should Be Liable for Fraud 
Micro-cap stock fraud follows a familiar pattern—the introducing firm 
engages in market manipulation, unauthorized trading, parking of securities, 
excessive trading, or refusing to execute sell orders.66  The clearing firm 
ignores customer complaints, often referring the investors back to the 
introducing firm, who generally has already failed to respond to that 
same complaint.67  The clearing firm is well aware that the broker’s 
activities look fraudulent.68  It continues to extend credit and facilitate 
transactions that assist the introducing firm in meeting its net capital 
requirements, knowing that if it fails to do so, the introducing firm will 
go under and will be unable to pay money owed to the clearing firm.  
The clearing firm does these things, apparently secure in the belief that it 
will not be held liable for the securities fraud perpetrated by the 
introducing firm—even if it knows of the fraud, and even if it assists the 
introducing firm in its commission.69 
The signs of securities fraud are apparent to clearing firms.70  
Protecting investors is a primary goal of securities laws.71  Allowing 
clearing firms to continue to process transactions for an introducing firm 
under these circumstances runs counter to the need to protect investors.  
In fact, the current industry-wide belief that clearing firms will not be 
held liable for knowingly assisting an introducing firm’s fraud has 
encouraged clearing firms to turn a blind eye to fraud.72  Imposing 
liability on clearing firms that have reason to know of securities fraud 
serves a powerful deterrent function. 
Clearing firms should be liable for the fraud of introducing firms 
because most victims of securities fraud have no other recourse.  A 
 
 66. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 33–44. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Koruga, 2000 WL 33534559, at *9. 
 70. REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 72–73, 85; see also 
Gary Weiss, How the SEC Is Passing the Buck on Microcaps, BUS. WK., May 18, 1998, 
at 150 (stating that clearing firms “often are the first to see the ‘red flags’ of stock 
fraud”). 
 71. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 296 
(1993). 
 72. See, e.g., Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559, at *22 
(N.A.S.D. Oct. 2, 2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.) (noting that clearing firm 
Hanifen’s position was that it would be unfair to impose liability, because the clearing 
firm believed that the law insulated them from liability). 
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recent article in Barron’s, recounting a conversation with Barry 
Goldsmith, executive vice president of enforcement for the NASD, 
stated: “Most victims of securities fraud never see a dime in 
restitution . . . because firms go out of business or ‘morph into 
something else.’”73  Individual brokers and control persons typically 
declare bankruptcy.74  A select few are criminally prosecuted.  Most 
firms have no assets once the fraud is uncovered.75  Firms withdraw 
from registration as broker-dealers, often reopening under different 
names.76  One 1998 analysis of the SEC penalty collection rate showed 
that the SEC “collects only about half of the financial penalties it 
imposes on securities-law violators, leaving $2.5 billion uncollected 
over the past 13 years.”77  The article goes on to add that “[a]mong the 
biggest nonpayers are some major alleged purveyors of small-stock 
fraud.”78  Firms often declare bankruptcy after being hit with a 
judgment.79  This 1998 report focused on the SEC collection rate for its 
own financial penalties, but the same issues are exacerbated in the 
collection of civil judgments. 
Industry members argue that if liability is imposed on clearing firms, 
the costs of clearing will go up dramatically.80  These costs will be 
passed on to introducing firms and customers, driving up the cost of 
doing business, and putting smaller firms out of business.81  However, it 
is unclear whether the types of activities necessary to avoid liability 
under an aiding and abetting theory would prove unduly costly.  In fact, 
many clearing firms already have internal processes in place that are likely 
to satisfy any additional requirements.82  In any case, rather than viewing 
additional costs as a burden on individual investors and small firms, it is 
important to realize that clearing firms are in an ideal position to spread 
the costs of due diligence to their customers—which may be preferable to 
imposing the cost of noncompliance on the individual victims of securities 
fraud.  It is not at all clear that the individual costs to defrauded investors 
are lower than the costs of due diligence by clearing firms.83 
 
 73. Jim McTague, Naughty, Naughty, BARRON’S, Sept. 3, 2001, at 31. 
 74. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. at 2–3, 66–69. 
 77. Michael Schroeder, SEC Collects Only Half Its Financial Penalties, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 26, 1998, at A3. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 16–17, 
Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-
1415 MA). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See REPORT ON MICRO-CAP STOCK FRAUD, supra note 3, at 78–79. 
 83. See generally John M. Bellwoar, Note, Bar Baron at the Gate: An Argument 
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Finally, clearing firms benefit financially from the fraud by continuing 
to process trades for broker-dealers engaged in fraudulent activity.  
Clearing is an extremely profitable business for large broker-dealers.84  
Clearing firms that continue to extend credit, or fail to report introducing 
firms after becoming aware that they are not satisfying their net capital 
requirements legitimately, help those firms stay in business in violation of 
securities laws.  The introducing firms are then able to perpetrate more 
violations.  By keeping the introducing firm in business, the clearing firm is 
attempting to salvage its own financial position relative to the introducing 
firms at the expense of the broker’s customers.  Under these types of 
circumstances, it seems reasonable to extend liability to clearing firms. 
III.  THE KORUGA ARBITRATION AWARD 
In the past few years, there has been a quiet revolution in arbitration 
awards—arbitration panels have been finding clearing firms liable for 
the fraud of their introducing firms.  Arbitration panels rarely, if ever, 
provide explanations for their awards, so the legal grounds for such 
awards are often unclear.  However, in October 2000, an arbitration 
panel in Oregon cleared the air by finding the clearing firm Hanifen, 
Imhoff Clearing Corporation (now known as Fiserv Correspondent 
Services) secondarily liable for the fraud of the boiler room Duke & 
Company, and perhaps more importantly, by issuing a lengthy 
arbitration award identifying what the panel viewed as the successful 
legal theories of liability based on the securities laws of Washington and 
California.85  A U.S. district court upheld the award, and the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.86 
 
for Expanding the Liability of Securities Clearing Brokers for the Fraud of Introducing 
Brokers, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1014 (1999) (arguing in favor of imposing liability based on 
economic efficiency). 
 84. As one journalist aptly stated: “For large brokerages, the clearing business is a 
cash cow.”  Gary Weiss, Clearing Firm, Clear Thyself, BUS. WK., July 7, 1997, at 120. 
 85. Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559, at *1 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2, 
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.). 
 86. Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D. Or. 
2001), aff’d, No. 01-35295, 2002 WL 530548 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2002) (unpublished 
opinion).  Due to the liberal standard of review given to arbitration awards, a district 
court is unlikely to vacate an award, and an appeals court is unlikely to overturn a district 
court decision.  A district court may vacate an award if it is completely irrational, 
procured by fraud or corruption, or if the panel was aware of the applicable law and yet 
completely ignored it.  Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); see also United 
Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 (1987); Decker v. Merrill 
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Although arbitration awards have no precedential value87—they are not 
produced by courts of law—the Koruga award has generated a 
considerable amount of controversy.88  Arbitration panels often look to the 
decisions of other panels for guidance.  In fact, the Koruga panel stated: 
“We hope our willingness to take on this task will encourage future 
NASD panels to be more forthcoming, so that a body of meaningful 
precedents, interpreting the securities laws of various states, may become 
available . . . .”89  Indeed, the Securities Industry Association (SIA), an 
industry trade group, has gone so far as to request that the explanation of the 
award be struck.90  This suggests a general awareness by industry members 
that other panels may be more likely to issue similar awards if attorneys and 
arbitrators are able to use the Koruga explanation to support their positions. 
Historically, securities fraud cases have been brought under section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934 (section 10(b))91 and SEC Rule 10b-5 
(Rule 10b-5)92 (implementing section 10(b)).  In 1994, the Supreme 
Court eliminated what had been an implied private right of action for 
aiding and abetting under section 10(b) with its decision in Central Bank 
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.93  Prior to 1994, plaintiffs 
and claimants were able to argue that clearing firms had aided and 
abetted the fraud of introducing firms, although satisfying the elements 
of the cause of action was difficult.  Now that there is no federal civil 
liability for aiding and abetting, the Koruga award presents us with new 
ways to think about clearing firm liability. 
IV.  LIABILITY FOR SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER THE SECURITIES 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
A.  Primary Liability 
In 1933 and 1934, Congress enacted two major pieces of securities 
legislation: the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)94 and the Securities 
 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 205 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2000); Todd Shipyards 
Corp. v. Cunard Line Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 87. See DAVID ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL 589 (3d 
ed. 1998). 
 88. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 7 (discussing the controversy); Morgenson, supra 
note 7, at § 3, at 1. 
 89. Koruga, 2000 WL 33534559, at *12. 
 90. Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 1, Koruga, 183 
F. Supp. 2d at 1245 (No. 00-1415 MA). 
 91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000)). 
 92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). 
 93. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 94. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77bbbb (2000)). 
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Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).95  The 1933 Act regulates the primary 
market (the initial distribution of securities), whereas the 1934 Act regulates 
the secondary markets and the postdistribution trading of securities.96 
There are a number of different provisions in both Acts relating to 
securities fraud, but the majority of fraud claims against broker-dealers 
are brought under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.  Section 10(b) states, in 
pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities 
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe . . . .97 
This section is not self-operative; the “manipulative or deceptive device 
or contrivance” must be in violation of some other rule or regulation 
established by the SEC.  The SEC has established a number of such 
rules under section 10(b), including Rule 10b-5. 
Rule 10b-5 identifies the specific practices that constitute a violation 
of section 10(b):98 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,  
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or  
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.99 
Although section 10(b) does not expressly contain a private right of 
action whereby private plaintiffs can sue for damages, courts have been 
 
 95. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000)). 
 96. The 1934 Act was designed “to deter fraud and manipulative practices in the 
securities markets.”  Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 
286, 296 (1993) (quoting Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986)). 
 97. 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).  For an account of the adoption of Rule 10b-5 in 
1942, see IX LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 4383–84 (3d ed. 1992). 
 99. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). 
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implying civil liability for violations of the statute for many years.100 
As a result of the broad language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a 
large body of federal common law has developed to limit section 10(b) 
and bring it in line with common law fraud claims.101  In order to prevail 
in a section 10(b) action, the plaintiff must prove the following: that (1) 
the defendant made an untrue statement of material fact, (2) the conduct 
occurred in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (3) the 
defendant made the statement or omission with scienter,102 (4) the 
plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation or omission,103 and (5) the 
plaintiff suffered damage as a result.104 
It is difficult to establish a clearing broker’s primary liability for 
securities fraud under section 10(b).  Primarily liability requires that the 
plaintiff establish the direct participation of the clearing firm in the 
scheme to defraud and that the clearing firm “directly and knowingly 
participated in the deceptive or manipulative conduct that caused 
damage to the Plaintiffs.”105  If a plaintiff can establish that a clearing 
firm is “itself engaged in the kind of manipulative conduct that Section 
10(b) prohibits,”106 primary liability to the plaintiff can also be 
established.  However, in most cases of securities fraud, clearing firms 
only participate in the fraud by not preventing the introducing firm from 
perpetrating it, not informing the customers of the introducing firm of the 
fraud, or benefiting from the ongoing business of the introducing firm.107 
In order for an omission to constitute a primary violation, the plaintiff 
must establish that the clearing firm had a fiduciary duty to the customer 
of the introducing firm.108  Failure to inform customers of the fraud, or 
failure to prevent the introducing firm from engaging in fraudulent 
activities, is not by itself sufficient to establish direct participation in the 
absence of a fiduciary duty.109 
 
 100. For a discussion, see Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171; and IX LOSS & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 9, at 4383 n.434 (3d ed. 1992).  Note that a “private plaintiff may not bring a 
10b-5 suit against a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 10(b).”  Central 
Bank, 511 U.S. at 173. 
 101. See VII LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 3488–89 (3d ed. 1991). 
 102. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (stating that the 
standard cannot be negligence); In re Blech Sec. Litig., 961 F. Supp. 569, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
 103. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). 
 104. See Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 
1992); In re Blech Sec. Litig., 961 F. Supp. at 582; Connolly v. Havens, 763 F. Supp. 6, 
10 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 
1011, 1015 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 105. In re Blech Sec. Litig., 961 F. Supp. at 582. 
 106. Id. at 583. 
 107. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 108. Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 109. Id. 
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The fiduciary duty requirement is a major hurdle to finding a clearing 
firm primarily liable for an introducing firm’s fraud.  In Connolly v. 
Havens,110 a New York district court held that even if the plaintiffs could 
establish the clearing firm’s direct participation in the fraud, the primary 
liability claim would still fail because “[i]t is well-established that a 
clearing firm . . . does not have a fiduciary relationship with the 
customers . . . of the introducing broker with which it has contracted to 
perform clearing services.”111  As a result of this failure to establish a 
fiduciary duty, the primary liability claim did not survive the clearing 
firm’s motion for summary judgment.112 
B.  Control Person Liability 
Control person liability is a form of secondary liability for securities 
fraud.  Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act establishes joint and several liability 
for those persons who control the persons committing the fraud: 
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls a person liable under any 
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be 
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled 
person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the 
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce 
the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.113 
Rule 12b-2 clarifies that control person liability may exist where the 
person has “the power to direct or cause the direction of the management 
and policies of a person.”114  Courts have regularly held that control 
person liability does not apply to clearing firms.   
There is a circuit split regarding the proper test for control person 
liability.115  Under any test, however, the nature of the post-1982 
relationship between clearing firms and introducing firms makes it 
difficult to establish that the clearing firm had the power or ability to 
control the introducing firm.116  For example, the ability to refuse to 
 
 110. 763 F. Supp 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 111. Id. at 10. 
 112. Id. at 11. 
 113. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2000). 
 114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2001). 
 115. See Gerald B. Kline & Raymond L. Moss, Liability of Clearing Firms: 
Traditional and Developing Perspectives, in 2 SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1998: 
REDEFINING PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES 147–49 (PLI Corporate & Practice Course, 
Handbook Series No. B-1062, 1998). 
 116. See generally Dillon v. Militano, 731 F. Supp 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).  See also 
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process trades has not been sufficient to establish control person liability.117 
Prior to 1982, the NYSE allocated supervisory responsibilities to 
clearing firms.  In 1982, NYSE Rules 382 and 405 were changed so as to 
eliminate the clearing firm’s supervisory responsibilities over the agents of 
the introducing firm,118 effectively eliminating the clearing firm’s exposure 
to control person liability.  Since 1982, clearing firms have continually 
argued that they perform no supervisory or oversight functions.119 
A few courts have found clearing firms liable under section 20(a), but 
these tend to be older decisions.120  Though this type of argument is out 
of favor today, some plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that under the current 
NYSE Rule 382, clearing firms have to provide regulators with 
information regarding the introducing firm, including customer 
complaints.  Accordingly, they argue, clearing firms have an implied 
duty to monitor the behavior of introducing firms.121  However, the 
NYSE explicitly states that current reporting obligations “further clarify 
the relationship and responsibilities between introducing and carrying 
organizations without altering the fundamental carrying/clearing 
contractual relationship.”122  Because the duty under section 20(a) did 
not exist before the rule changes, a new duty will not be established 
under the new rule. 
C.  Aiding and Abetting Liability 
In 1994, the United States Supreme Court changed the face of 
securities litigation with its decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver.123  In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme 
Court held that “a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and 
 
In re Blech Sec. Litig., 961 F. Supp. 569, 586–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that affecting 
the actions of an introducing firm is not sufficient to establish that the clearing firm 
directed them). 
 117. See Carlson v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 906 F.2d 315, 318–19 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Damato v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 1156, 1160 (N.D. 
Ill.1995). 
 118. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 848–50. 
 119. See, e.g., Neiman v. Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 
196, 201–02 (1988). 
 120. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104, 
122–23 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (holding that the clearing firm controlled the introducing firm 
by way of the clearing agreement, because the clearing firm identified policies regarding 
the way business was to be conducted); see Philip M. Aidikoff et al., Clearing Firm 
Liability: A Forward Looking Analysis, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1998: REDEFINING 
PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES, supra note 115, at 118–24 (discussing older cases finding 
liability under control person theory), WL 1062 PLI/Corp 113. 
 121. See Aidikoff et al., supra note 120, at 135. 
 122. NYSE Info. Memo No. 99–33, at 4 (July 1, 1999), available at 1999 NYSE 
Info. Memo LEXIS 28. 
 123. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
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abetting suit under § 10(b).”124  Prior to the Central Bank decision, every 
circuit had recognized a private cause of action against aiders and 
abettors under section 10(b).125  Although this decision eliminated 
federal aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud, the test for 
liability—and its application to clearing firms—is still very important, 
because some states have interpreted their own secondary liability 
provisions by reference to the federal standard.126 
Though the interpretation of the test varied by circuit,127 the three-part 
test required that the plaintiff establish: (1) a primary violation of section 
10(b), (2) actual knowledge or recklessness as to the existence of the 
primary violation,128 and (3) “substantial assistance” of the violation.129  
Substantial assistance required a “substantial causal connection between 
the culpable conduct of the alleged aider and abettor and the harm to the 
plaintiff . . . .”130  The elements of knowledge and substantial assistance 
were analyzed in reference to one another.131  Both elements posed 
problems with regard to clearing firm liability for securities fraud. 
The scienter requirement presented a high hurdle for plaintiffs 
attempting to impose liability on clearing firms.  Most courts required 
that the aider have knowledge of the primary violation,132 although there 
 
 124. Id. at 191. 
 125. Id. at 192.  Legislation enacted in 1995 gave the SEC the ability to bring aiding 
and abetting actions, but Congress decided not to extend this ability to private litigants.  
See supra note 56. 
 126. See, e.g., Foley v. Allard, 427 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. 1988). 
 127. Most of the circuits based their version of the test on the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts formulation.  Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 194.  The Tenth Circuit formulation was 
followed by the lower court in Central Bank.  Id. at 168. 
 128. At the time Central Bank was decided, there was a circuit split as to whether 
the standard was knowledge, recklessness, awareness of, or intent to further the primary 
violation.  Generally, the more substantial the assistance, the lower the applicable 
scienter standard.  See Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting 
Securities Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637, 727–39 (1997–1988).  
Because of the Central Bank decision, this issue was never resolved. 
 129. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 168; see also First Interstate Bank of Denver v. 
Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 130. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Mendelsohn v. 
Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 1979)). 
 131. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 128, at 729.  As one court stated, these 
two elements should not “be considered in isolation, but rather should be considered 
relative to one another.”  Metge, 762 F.2d at 624 (citing Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 
784 (8th Cir. 1981)). 
 132. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 128, at 670–71; see also Connolly v. 
Havens, 763 F. Supp. 6, 10–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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were significant differences in the interpretation of this requirement.133  
In the absence of a fiduciary duty, most courts required at least actual 
knowledge of the fraud and, more frequently, intent to defraud.134  This 
requirement led to unsuccessful results for plaintiffs who argued that a 
clearing firm aided the fraud by failing to stop clearing trades or failing 
to notify the plaintiff of the fraud.  As with primary liability claims, 
clearing firms were able to argue that they had no independent duty to 
the customer.135  In the absence of a fiduciary duty, courts required more 
than actual knowledge of the primary violation—something closer to 
conscious intent to participate in the fraud.136  In effect, this type of 
requirement blurred the distinction between primary and secondary liability. 
In order to establish the substantial assistance element of aiding and 
abetting, the plaintiff had to show that the clearing firm went beyond its 
normal clearing duties or that the clearing firm had a fiduciary duty to 
the customer of the introducing firm, which it violated by its inaction, 
omission, or silence.137  Neither of these was easy to establish.  District 
courts interpreting this section typically treated performance of standard 
clearing firm responsibilities as ministerial or clerical in nature and not 
sufficient to establish substantial assistance.138  For example, in Ross v. 
Bolton,139 a district court held that clearing trades and loaning money to 
the alleged primary violator were not sufficient to establish substantial 
assistance because “[a]wareness and approval, standing alone, do not 
constitute substantial assistance.”140  Instead, courts required that something 
more than “ordinary business activity” be present.141  Under this definition 
of substantial assistance, it was easy for a clearing firm to argue successfully 
that even if it had actual knowledge of the fraud, continuing to clear trades 
and extend credit constituted only normal business activity.  The difficulty 
of establishing a fiduciary duty to customers has already been discussed; the 
same issues arise in this context as well. 
Prior to the 1982 changes to NYSE Rules 382 and 405, plaintiffs 
could establish the duty element with less difficulty and, as a result, 
could demonstrate aiding and abetting liability more easily.  In the 1970 
 
 133. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 128, at 670–700. 
 134. Id at 671. 
 135. Stander v. Fin. Clearing & Servs. Corp, 730 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); Antinoph v. Laverell Reynolds Sec., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 (E.D. Pa. 
1989); Ross v. Bolton, 639 F. Supp. 323, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 136. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 128, at 728. 
 137. Id. at 727–39. 
 138. See, e.g., Dillon v. Militano, 731 F. Supp. 634, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Antinoph, 
703 F. Supp. at 1189. 
 139. 639 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 140. Id. at 327. 
 141. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 128, at 723. 
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SEC opinion, D.H. Blair & Co.,142 the SEC imposed on clearing firms 
“an independent obligation to make appropriate inquiry and take prompt 
steps to terminate any participation in activity violative of the securities 
laws.”143  Conceivably, failure to satisfy this obligation could constitute 
a duty sufficient to establish liability for aiding and abetting an 
introducing firm’s fraud.144 
Following the 1982 NYSE rule changes, however, the clearing firm’s 
role and obligations changed.  In Stander v. Financial Clearing & 
Services Corp.,145 a New York district court noted that “the simple 
providing of normal clearing services to a primary broker who is acting 
in violation of the law does not make out a case of aiding and abetting 
against the clearing broker.”146  Because the introducing and clearing 
brokers had executed a clearing agreement—making the introducing 
firm responsible for supervisory functions required under NYSE Rule 
405,147 as permitted by NYSE Rule 382148—the court was unwilling to 
“find that Rule 405 imposes any fiduciary duty upon [the clearing firm] 
under the circumstances of this case.”149 
In any case, with the demise of the implied aiding and abetting cause 
of action, there is no longer a federal civil action for secondary aiding 
and abetting liability.  Following the Central Bank decision, many 
predicted that courts and arbitration panels would extend primary 
liability to more circumstances than had previously been covered by 
 
 142. 44 S.E.C. 320 (1970). 
 143. Id. at 328. 
 144. See Cannizzaro v. Bache, Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 719, 721 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).  See generally Margaret Hall Found., Inc. v. Atl. Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 572 
F. Supp. 1475 (D. Mass. 1983); Faturik v. Woodmere Sec., Inc., 442 F. Supp 943 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).  It is unclear whether the duty owed was to the customer as well as to 
the regulators.  See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 12, at 61 (arguing that the courts 
misunderstood the nature of the requirement when interpreting this section as involving a 
duty to the customer). 
 145. 730 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 146. Id. at 1286. 
 147. NYSE CONSTITUTION AND RULES, Rule 405, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2405 
(Aug. 31, 1999). 
 148. NYSE CONSTITUTION AND RULES, Rule 382, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2382. 
 149. Stander, 730 F. Supp. at 1287.  The Stander court did not deal with the kinds 
of stock fraud described earlier; instead, the case involved excessive and unsuitable 
trading in a customer account perpetrated by an individual broker employed by the 
introducing firm.  The case turned on whether the clearing firm had the duty to monitor 
or supervise the individual broker.  Because the clearing agreement clearly delegated the 
supervision of individual brokers to the introducing firm, the court found no liability for 
the clearing firm.  Id. 
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aiding and abetting liability.150  However, this extension has not 
materialized.151  As a result of these developments, the answer to 
clearing firm liability for the fraud of introducing firms is not likely to 
be found in primary violations of federal securities laws. 
V.  SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR CLEARING FIRMS UNDER THE UNIFORM 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1956 
A.  Problems Regarding the Development of Case Law 
One of the issues facing arbitration panels that hear cases involving 
clearing firms is the relative lack of post-Central Bank case law, in both 
the federal and the state arena.  Ever since the Supreme Court upheld 
mandatory arbitration for nearly all customer claims against brokers in 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,152 the vast majority of 
cases have gone to arbitration as opposed to federal or state court.153  
Because arbitration awards do not have precedential value and very few 
cases make it into the court system, there has been very little, if any, 
development of the law.154 
A second, related problem with the development of the law in this 
area is that even when arbitration panels have been willing to extend 
liability to clearing firms, they are not required to, and rarely do, 
provide any kind of explanation for their decision.155  As a result, 
future arbitration panels that might consider extending liability have no 
real guidance as to how this might be done and cannot feel confident 
that their decision is consistent with those of other panels. 
Arbitration awards can be appealed to U.S. district courts; courts 
typically uphold the awards because as long as some theory of liability 
 
 150. See, e.g., S. Scott Luton, The Ebb & Flow of § 10(b) Jurisprudence: An 
Analysis of Central Bank, 17 U. ARK. L. J. 45, 47 (1994). 
 151. See Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of 
Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1300–03 (1999) 
(discussing circuit splits regarding the extension of primary liability to “outside 
professionals”); Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, The Limits of Central Bank’s 
Textualist Approach—Attempts to Overdraw the Bank Prove Unsuccessful, 26 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1, 46 (1997) (addressing line drawing between primary and secondary liability). 
 152. 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987). 
 153. Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559 at *10 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2, 
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.). 
 154. Id. at *11. 
 155. Arbitration awards are typically a few paragraphs long and simply state who is 
liable and for how much.  Most do not even attempt to justify the award.  See, e.g., GMS 
Group, L.L.C. v. Herbert J. Sims & Co., No. 00-05205, 2002 WL 31058232 (N.A.S.D. 
Aug. 8, 2002); Rothberg v. Acument Sec., Inc., No. 01-03023, 2002 WL 1948217 
(N.A.S.D. Aug. 6, 2002). 
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makes the award possible, there is no “manifest disregard of the law.”156  
In general, the only real authority provided by these decisions is that 
district courts are willing to hold that clearing firms can conceivably be 
found liable for something.  These types of decisions are better than 
nothing; plaintiffs’ attorneys often rely on them when arguing in favor of 
expanding liability.  However, the decisions do not provide the kind of 
body of case law available in other areas of law.  Since the demise of 
aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) and the enforcement of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in customer agreements, there has been very 
little case law testing the extent of secondary liability under state law. 
B.  The Content of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 
The Uniform Act states that there is a private right of action for all 
fraud claims brought under it.157  Section 101 is similar to Rule 10b-5: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of 
any security, directly or indirectly 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading, or  
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person.158 
Section 410 of the Uniform Act limits civil enforcement to buyers 
of securities.159  Section 410(b) of the Uniform Act identifies the 
persons liable under section 101, and provides for a right of 
contribution: 
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under subsection 
(a), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, every person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller 
who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially 
aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as 
the seller, unless the non-seller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that 
he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the 
 
 156. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 
1991).  See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (providing the law 
governing the vacation of arbitration awards by courts). 
 157. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410 (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 266 (2000). 
 158. Id. § 101, 7C U.L.A. 110. 
 159. Id. § 410, 7C U.L.A. 266. 
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existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.  There is 
contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so liable.160 
Three elements must be established in order to show that section 
410(b) applies to a particular defendant: (1) a primary violation of 
section 101; (2) the defendant is a broker-dealer or agent as required by 
section 410(b); and (3) the defendant “materially aided” in the sale.  The 
defendant can then establish that it had no reason to know of the facts 
constituting the violation as an affirmative defense. 
The Uniform Act cause of action for secondary liability differs 
markedly from the former aiding and abetting under section 10(b).  
First, liability is restricted to the class of persons identified in the 
statute, which includes broker-dealers.  Second, “materially aids in the 
sale” is not defined, and there is no reason to think it is identical to the 
former “substantial assistance” requirement under federal law.  
Finally, the federal standard required that the plaintiff show that the 
defendant had at least actual knowledge of the primary offense.  
Under the Uniform Act formulation, however, once the plaintiff has 
shown that the defendant materially aided in the sale, it is up to the 
defendant to show that he did not know, and could not have known, 
“of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.”161  
This amounts to a negligence standard, which is much easier for 
plaintiffs to establish. 
C.  State Court Interpretations of Section 410(b) 
Few cases have dealt explicitly with secondary liability for 
brokerage firms under state antifraud laws.  The Alabama Supreme 
Court remarked in 1986 that “[i]t is interesting that while this section 
is based almost verbatim on § 410-(b) of the Uniform Securities Act, 
adopted in Alabama in 1959, and which has been adopted by many 
other states, there are few cases from other jurisdictions which give 
guidance” regarding the interpretation of the section.162  Only a 
handful of states have considered the extent of secondary liability 
under statutes based on the Uniform Act, even though the vast 
majority of states have adopted some form of its antifraud 
provisions.163  In all but one case,164 the courts have recognized that 
 
 160. Id. § 410(b), 7C U.L.A. 266 (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Sec. Co., 482 So. 2d 1201, 1207 (Ala. 1986). 
 163. See I LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 73–76 & nn.114–16. 
 164. In Foley v. Allard, a pre-Central Bank decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
decided to follow the federal aiding and abetting test over that provided by its own state 
statute, which is based on section 410 of the Uniform Act.  427 N.W.2d 647, 650–51 
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the statute goes considerably beyond the former federal aiding and 
abetting cause of action.165 
The Alabama Supreme Court was one of the first courts to interpret 
section 410(b) in Foster v. Jesup and Lamont Securities Co.166  In 
Foster, the Eleventh Circuit certified a number of questions regarding 
the application of state securities laws to the Alabama Supreme Court, 
noting that Alabama securities law—which mirrors the Uniform Act—
was significantly broader than federal law.  The Alabama court provided 
the following summary of its blue sky law: 
[A]ll [the plaintiff] need do is establish the defendant’s status, either as a 
controlling person, a partner, or an occupant of some other statutory 
classification [as here a broker-dealer who materially aids in the sale], plus the 
fact of the seller’s liability.  The defendant is then left with only one 
defense . . . .  He may show that he did not know, and in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of 
which the seller’s liability is alleged to exist.167 
Oregon’s version of section 410(b) is also very important to this 
discussion because there is a substantial amount of case law interpreting 
the provision.168  This is due at least in part to Oregon’s revision to the 
Uniform Act that extended liability for materially aiding a violation of 
section 101 to “every person,” not just “every broker dealer and 
 
(Minn. 1988).  The court based its reasoning on another section of the Minnesota 
Securities Act, stating: “[T]he Minnesota Securities Act is to be construed so as to 
‘coordinate the interpretation of [the state statutes] with the related federal regulation.’  
We have determined, therefore, that federal case law is of considerable value as 
precedent in deciding issues arising under the act.”  Id. at 650 (citations omitted) 
(quoting Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d 520, 534 (Minn. 1986)).  The 
court then applied the three-part federal aiding and abetting test.  Id.  It is not clear what 
the Minnesota court would have decided in the absence of a federal aiding and abetting 
theory. 
 165. See, e.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1327 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(applying Arkansas law), aff’d sub nom., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993); 
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101 (Conn. 1997); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. 
Giacomi, 659 A.2d 1166, 1176 (Conn. 1995); Iowa ex rel Goettsch v. Diacide Distribs., 
Inc., 561 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1997); Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Or. 
1988); Adams v. Am. W. Sec., 510 P.2d 838, 844 (Or. 1973); Foster, 482 So. 2d at 1207. 
 166. 482 So. 2d 1201 (Ala. 1986). 
 167. Id. at 1207 (emphasis in original) (alteration in original) (quoting J. Michael 
Rediker, Alabama’s “Blue Sky Law”—Its Dubious History and Its Current Renaissance, 
23 ALA. L. REV. 667, 714 (1971)). 
 168. The Koruga panel relied heavily on Oregon case law in determining whether 
Fiserv had materially aided the sale of securities.  See Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 
2000 WL 33534559 at *18 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2, 2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, 
Arbs.). 
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agent.”169  This change has resulted in more cases going into the court 
system, rather than into arbitration.170 
D.  Applying Section 410(b) to Clearing Firms 
1.  Definition of Broker-Dealer 
Section 401(c) of the Uniform Act defines broker-dealer as “any person 
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the 
account of others . . . .”171  “Effecting transactions” is not further defined.  
In Koruga, Fiserv Correspondent Services (formerly Hanifen, Imhoff 
Clearing Corporation) argued that it was not a broker-dealer because it 
was “not engaged in the business of ‘effecting transactions in securities for 
the accounts of others.’”172  However, it is difficult to see how this could 
be the case.  Clearing firms are engaged in the business of bringing about, or 
effecting, securities transactions; that is, after all, why they are retained.173 
In its amicus brief in support of the clearing firm’s appeal of the 
Koruga award, the SIA claimed that a distinction should be made 
between the registration status of a firm that engages in “‘central and 
specialized’ functions that impact on a customer’s decision to buy or sell 
securities” and the essentially “clerical” and “operational” functions 
performed by the clearing firm.174  They argued that although a clearing 
firm is required to register as a broker-dealer, the difference between the 
functions performed by the two firms is what is relevant to the definition 
of broker-dealer under the Uniform Act.175  However, the definition of 
broker-dealer does not distinguish between effecting transactions, 
soliciting transactions, or participating in transactions.176  In fact, primary 
liability for fraud is applied to broker-dealers who solicit or participate 
in the sale under section 410(a).177  In order for a separate provision for 
secondary liability for broker-dealers to make sense at all, effecting 
transactions could not be identical to soliciting or participating in them. 
 
 169. OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2001). 
 170. Koruga, 2000 WL 33534559 at *18. 
 171. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(c) (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 188 (2000).  A few cases 
have addressed whether specific entities come under the categories of “broker-dealer or 
agent.”  See, e.g., Atlanta Skin & Cancer Clinic v. Hallmark Gen. Partners, 463 S.E.2d 
600, 603 (S.C. 1995) (holding that a bank is not a broker-dealer or agent under the 
statute). 
 172. Koruga, 2000 WL 33534559, at *16. 
 173. The Koruga panel quickly disposed of Fiserv’s argument.  Id. 
 174. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 23, Koruga 
v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-1415 MA). 
 175. See id. 
 176. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(c), 7C U.L.A. 188. 
 177. Id. § 410(a), 7C U.L.A. 266. 
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2.  The Material Aid Requirement 
The element most likely to pose problems for those arguing in favor of 
secondary liability for clearing firms is the “material aid” requirement.  
Courts have regularly held that the material aid standard is not identical 
to the former substantial assistance standard.178  For example, in Foster 
v. Jesup & Lamont Securities Co.,179 the Alabama Supreme Court 
considered whether “materially aid” involved a looser standard than, or 
an identical standard to that imposed by the “substantial factor” 
requirement necessary to find liability under section 12(2) of the 1933 
Act.180  The court responded that it was not necessary to show that a 
person was a substantial factor in the sale of a security in order to 
establish that he had materially aided in the sale of securities.181 
The courts addressing the statute have interpreted “aiding” broadly.182  
According to one commentator, aiding “focuses upon activities which do 
not directly lead to the sale, but rather make it possible.”183  Under the 
Uniform Act, “materiality relates to the importance of the contribution 
toward making the sale possible.”184  By way of contrast, Ohio’s blue 
 
 178. A number of states have already held (or have stated in dicta) that “materially 
aid” does involve a lower standard than “substantial assistance.”  See, e.g., Arthur Young 
& Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Arkansas law), aff’d sub nom., 
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993); Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Sec. Co., 482 
So. 2d 1201 (Ala. 1986); Iowa ex rel. Goettsch v. Diacide Distribs., Inc. 561 N.W.2d 369 
(Iowa 1997); Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988). 
 179. 482 So. 2d 1201 (Ala. 1986). 
 180. Id. at 1204.  Foster dealt with the sale of an unregistered security under section 
12(2) of the 1933 Act rather than fraud in the sale of a security on the secondary market 
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.  The test for establishing fraud under section 12(2) 
relies on whether the aider was a “substantial factor in the sale” and whether the district 
court had treated the “substantial factor” identically to the “materially aid” requirement.  Id. 
 181. Id. at 1207–08.  The Eighth Circuit relied on the Foster court’s interpretation 
of section 410(b) when it considered a similar case based on Arkansas law.  In Arthur 
Young & Co. v. Reves, the Eighth Circuit compared Arkansas and Alabama securities 
laws and agreed that Arkansas has its own statutory aiding and abetting provision.  937 
F.2d at 1326.  The court concluded that the trial court had set a higher standard than was 
necessary to meet the “materially aid” standard in its jury instructions but that, because 
the jury found that the higher standard had been met, there had been no error.  Id. at 
1327.  The court did not identify any criteria for “materially aid,” stating only that “the 
trial evidence provides ample support for the jury’s verdict.”  Id. at 1326. 
 182. For a discussion addressing the differences between aiding and participating, 
and aiding and abetting, see Joseph C. Long, Developments and Issues in Civil Liability 
Under Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 439, 460–63 (1993). 
 183. Id. at 461. 
 184. Id. at 462. 
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sky laws do not limit aid to material aid—aid of any kind will do.185  
This caveat makes the Ohio statute very broad.  The materiality 
requirement in the Uniform Act provides an important limitation on the 
type of aid necessary for liability.186 
The Oregon Supreme Court has provided some guidance in interpreting 
the material aid requirement.  In Prince v. Brydon,187 the court explained 
that participating in a sale is not necessary or sufficient to establish material 
aid; instead, it depends on the importance of the party’s contribution to the 
sale.188  Additionally, in an earlier case, the court held that an attorney had 
materially aided in the sale of securities even though the aid consisted of 
preparing documents  after the unauthorized sale took place.189  The court 
stated that the “sale would and could not have been completed or 
consummated” without the assistance of the attorney and that the timing of 
the sale was unrelated to the material aid provided by him.190 
Prince suggests that activities such as “[t]yping, reproducing, and 
delivering sales documents” are activities aiding a sale, although they 
are not necessarily material, because they could be performed by 
anyone.191  The term “material” provides the essential limitation on 
liability in the context of the Uniform Act, just as the term “substantial” 
provided the limitation in the substantial assistance test.  With respect to 
attorney preparation of documents, “it is a drafter’s knowledge, 
 
 185. In Federated Management Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, an Ohio appeals court 
provided for an expansive interpretation of the Ohio version of section 410.  738 N.E.2d 
842, 860–62 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).  The Ohio statute goes significantly beyond section 
410, providing that “every person who has participated in or aided the seller in any way 
in making such a contract or sale” is jointly and severally liable.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1707.43 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002).  See also Federated Mgmt. Co., 738 N.E.2d at 861 
(noting that the federal requirement that the aider and abettor have the intent to aid in the 
violation is not required under state law).  The Federated Mgmt. Co. court held that the 
participation or assistance may be in any form; contrary to the holding of the trial court, 
it is not necessary that the aider “induce a purchaser to invest in order to be held liable,” 
although that may be “one factor in determining liability.”  Id.; see also Marc I. 
Steinberg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny Skies for Investors, 62 
U. CIN. L. REV. 395, 424 n.152 (1993). 
 186. Steinberg, supra note 185, at 424–25. 
 187. 764 P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988). 
 188. A person may participate without materially aiding or materially aid without  
participating.  Whether one’s assistance in the sale is ‘material’ does not 
depend on one’s knowledge of the facts that make it unlawful; it depends on 
the importance of one’s personal contribution to the transaction.  Typing, 
reproducing, and delivering sales documents may all be essential to a sale, but 
they could be performed by anyone; it is a drafter’s knowledge, judgment, and 
assertions reflected in the contents of the documents that are “material” to the 
sale. 
Id. at 1371. 
 189. Adams v. Am. W. Sec., Inc., 510 P.2d 838, 844–45 (Or. 1973). 
 190. Id. at 845. 
 191. Prince, 764 P.2d at 1371. 
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judgment, and assertions reflected in the contents of the documents that 
are ‘material’ to the sale.”192  This seems to be what the district court had 
in mind in Hirata Corp. v. J.B. Oxford & Co.,193 when it cited Prince in 
support of the proposition that “those courts interpreting § 410 of the 
Uniform Act have not applied liability for ‘materially aiding’ to one who 
merely performed ‘ministerial functions.’”194 
The contrast with ministerial functions is not to be confused with 
normal or typical functions, however.  The Prince court makes it clear that 
“[t]he defense against strict liability . . . was to be a showing of ignorance, 
not the professional role of the person who renders material aid in the 
unlawful sale.”195  The normal activities of a lawyer preparing documents 
do constitute material aid of the sale;196 the lawyer must make a showing 
that he “did not know, and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not 
have known, of the existence of the facts on which liability is based.”197 
The Koruga arbitration panel found that Fiserv had materially aided the 
sale of securities by executing purchases and sales of securities, passing 
title to securities, sending confirmation slips and monthly or quarterly 
statements to customers, insuring customer accounts as required by SIPC, 
and extending credit to customers and to Hanifen.198  The panel stated: 
“To analogize the ministerial role of a data-inputting secretary to the very 
substantial functions of the clearing broker makes no sense.  Without the 
clearing broker, title in securities cannot pass to or from the customer nor 
can consideration for the transaction change hands.”199 
In its amicus brief in support of the clearing firm’s appeal of the 
Koruga award, the SIA argued that the ordinary activities of clearing 
brokers are “operational,” “clerical,” and “ministerial” in nature.200  The 
normal activities of a clearing firm with respect to processing 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. 193 F.R.D. 589 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
 194. Id. at 600. 
 195. Prince, 764 P.2d at 1372. 
 196. Id. at 1371–72. 
 197. Id. at 1372 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (2001)). 
 198. Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559 at *20–21 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2, 
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.). 
 199. Id. at *20. 
 200. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 17–24, 
Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-
1415 MA); see also Denson v. Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., 682 So. 2d 69 (Ala. 1996) 
(upholding summary judgment in favor of the defendant Bear, Stearns on grounds that 
the plaintiff had not shown that Bear, Stearns had performed anything other than 
bookkeeping functions with regard to the initial public offering of securities). 
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transactions and other documents are “ministerial” in the sense that 
processing, as opposed to selling, is involved.  However, the processing 
involved is quite complex, and the execution of transactions and the 
transfer of title to securities are not simply clerical activities.  They 
require expertise and systems not available to most introducing firms.201 
In addition, clearing firms engage in a number of activities that go 
well beyond simply making the transactions occur. 202  For example, 
assessments regarding whether to accept an order for processing and 
when to extend credit involve knowledge and judgment, although the 
mechanical distribution of monthly statements may not.  Decisions 
regarding whether to execute a transaction in an account after a customer 
has requested that the clearing firm not execute any further transactions 
involve judgment.  Clearing firms identify an introducing firm’s 
compliance with net capital requirements.  As the Bear, Stearns SEC 
action demonstrates, a clearing firm that continues to process 
transactions with knowledge that the introducing firm is violating the net 
capital rule is aiding and abetting a violation of federal securities laws.203 
These activities may be the normal activities of the clearing firm acting 
in its professional role, but that does not make the activities any less 
material.  As the court in Prince noted, a lawyer may be performing the 
normal professional duties of a lawyer in preparing documents and in so 
doing materially aid in the sale of securities.204  The fact that the activities 
themselves are typical for a lawyer was irrelevant to liability; instead, the 
relevant question is whether the lawyer had knowledge of facts on which 
the liability was based.205  Similarly, the fact that a clearing firm is performing 
its normal professional responsibilities does not render the duties 
“ministerial” and therefore outside of the scope of liability.  Instead, as 
long as the duties involve a “personal contribution to the transaction,”206 the 
clearing firm will need to show that it did not have knowledge of the fraud. 
 
 201. See Minnerop, supra note 12, at 842–43. 
 202. In a recent case, a New York district court upheld an arbitration award against 
Bear, Stearns in connection with the A.R. Baron fraud.  McDaniel v. Bear Stearns & Co., 
196 F. Supp. 2d 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  The arbitration panel had found that the following 
activities went beyond the scope of normal clearing activities: failing to report 
commissions and markups, processing trades that it knew were unauthorized, making 
loans to help A.R. Baron meet net capital requirements, making decisions regarding 
whether to process certain trades, and placing staff at the office of the introducing firm.  
Id. at 356.  The district court held that these activities provided a sufficient basis for 
upholding the award finding that Bear, Stearns had provided substantial assistance to 
A.R. Baron and had aided and abetted the fraud under New York law.  Id. 
 203. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.  The SEC can bring aiding and 
abetting actions under Rule 10b-5.  See supra note 56. 
 204. Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Or. 1988). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 1371. 
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3.  The Affirmative Defense 
Section 410(b) states that a broker-dealer who materially aids in a sale 
that is in violation of section 101 is jointly and severally liable with the 
seller, “unless the non-seller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof 
that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is 
alleged to exist.”207  Essentially, the defendant must prove that he could not 
have discovered the facts even had he exercised due care.208  As the 
Oregon court stated in Prince, for one working in a professional capacity, 
“[t]he defense against strict liability . . . [is] a showing of ignorance, not the 
professional role of the person who renders material aid in the unlawful 
sale.”209  In addition, the ignorance at issue is ignorance of the “facts by 
reason of which liability is alleged to exist”210 and not ignorance of the 
unlawfulness of the sale; the defendant need not even know that the sale 
was unlawful as long as he knew the facts that gave rise to the liability.211 
The affirmative defense will be hard to establish for clearing firms 
dealing with introducing firms engaged in widespread fraud.  If the 
evidence of fraud amounts to a failure legally to satisfy net capital 
requirements, widespread customer complaints of unauthorized trading 
and failure to execute sell orders, or other notable signs of fraud, a 
clearing firm would have known of the facts on which liability is based.  
The Koruga panel appeared to have no difficulty establishing that Fiserv 
 
 207. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b) (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 266 (2000). 
 208. In Connecticut National Bank v. Giacomi, the Connecticut Supreme Court held 
that Connecticut’s aiding and abetting statute established a negligence standard as to the 
knowledge requirement.  699 A.2d 101, 124 n.40 (Conn. 1997).  After the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case that a primary securities violation existed and that the 
defendant materially aided the violation, the defendant “can avoid liability if it can 
sustain its burden of persuasion that it did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable 
care could not have known, of the untruth or omission which constituted the violation of 
the securities law.”  Id. at 123. 
 209. Prince, 764 P.2d at 1372. 
 210. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b), 7C U.L.A. 266. 
 211. See also Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8 (Wash. 1990). 
Ignorance will be bliss only to the extent that [a defendant] can prove that even 
by the exercise of reasonable care he would have remained ignorant of the true 
state of affairs. . . .  The clear language of [the statute] imposes upon [a 
defendant] the burden of affirmatively proving that in the exercise of 
reasonable care they could not have learned [of the existence of the facts 
giving rise to the liability]. 
Id. at 18–19. 
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had actual knowledge of the fraud.212  If a clearing firm does not know 
of the fraud, it is likely due to a failure to follow appropriate regulations, 
which would constitute a failure to exercise due care.  In such a case, the 
clearing firm should have known of the facts on which liability is based.  
This is true because clearing firms are required to report complaints and 
violations of net capital to appropriate SROs.  These are exactly the 
types of cases where clearing firm liability ought to extend. 
The defense available to clearing firms in less egregious cases is that 
the firm had no reason to know of the facts constituting the violation.  If 
the clearing firm followed appropriate SEC and SRO rules and 
regulations, and adhered to its agreements with the introducing firm and 
its customers, and yet still could not have known of the fraud, then under 
this interpretation of the affirmative defense, no liability will extend.  
The defense would seem to be available in most cases involving the 
fraud of an introducing firm, such as unsuitability claims.   
The issue in close cases will be whether the clearing firm should have 
known of the facts constituting the primary violation.  For example, in a 
case where the introducing firm fabricates trading experience on an 
option agreement, the clearing firm can argue that in the exercise of 
reasonable care it could not have known of the existence of the violation.  
An example of where liability might be extended is in the case of 
excessive commissions or mark-ups.  Clearing firms produce commission 
reports for introducing firms, for example, and so might be said to know 
of the facts giving rise to the violation.  In addition, a clearing firm may 
receive complaints from customers regarding excessive commissions. 
Under this construction of the knowledge defense, clearing firm 
liability would not be extended to cases where either the clearing firm 
had no knowledge of the facts on which the fraud was based, or the 
clearing firm’s lack of knowledge was not due to its failure to follow 
appropriate regulations or otherwise exercise reasonable care.213  This 
standard should not be difficult to meet for most clearing firms under 
most circumstances.  Liability would be imposed in only the most 
egregious situations—those situations in which the clearing firm knew 
of the fraud yet continued to aid the introducing firm in perpetrating it 
and cases in which, had the clearing firm followed the appropriate 
regulations and procedures, the fraud would have been apparent. 
 
 212. Koruga v. Wang, No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559 at *7–8 (N.A.S.D. Oct. 2, 
2000) (Meyer, Hywel & Dunnington, Arbs.). 
 213. Willful ignorance should be considered knowledge in such cases, because the 
clearing firm will have had reason to believe that the fraud was occurring, and yet turned 
a blind eye nonetheless. 
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E.  Federal Preemption? 
The SIA has argued that application of section 410(b) to clearing 
brokers creates “a direct conflict with federal law and regulation,”214 
because in order to come under the affirmative defense provided by 
section 410(b), the clearing firm must exercise reasonable care.215  The 
argument seems to be that insofar as section 410(b) requires that more 
attention be paid to the activities of the introducing firm, it is in conflict 
with federal law and federal regulations.  Because the Uniform Act is 
meant to coordinate with federal regulation,216 blue sky laws are not able 
to impose any additional duties on clearing firms.217  However, the 
antifraud provisions of the Uniform Act are not preempted by either SRO 
or SEC regulation nor are they preempted by any federal legislation.218 
First of all, blue sky laws work in conjunction with other forms of 
regulation and are valid insofar as there is no explicit conflict with 
federal law.  States are free to enact legislation imposing duties 
additional to those provided by self-regulatory agencies.  The regulatory 
framework provided by SROs such as the NYSE or NASD does not 
preempt state law.  According to the Supreme Court, state law must not 
conflict with SRO rules “only if the rules are directly related to the 
purpose of the 1934 Act and are designed to insure fair dealing and 
investor protection.”219  NYSE Rule 382 and NASD Rule 3230 are 
internal rules.  There is no private right of action available to investors for 
their violation.  As a result, their purpose does not seem connected to the 
purposes of the 1934 Act.220  In addition, section 410(b) does not create a 
 
 214. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 26, Koruga 
v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-1415 MA). 
 215. Id. at 25–26. 
 216. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 415 (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 320 (2000). 
 217. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities Industry Association, Inc. at 26, Koruga 
(No. 00-1415 MA). 
 218. For an account of the constitutional limits on the preemption of state securities 
laws, see generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Protection: 
Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud, 60 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 169.  See also Brief of Amicus Curiae North 
American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. at 5–22, Koruga (No. 00-1415 
MA) (criticizing preemption arguments made by appellant and the SIA); I LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 41–42. 
 219. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1201 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“The rules of NASD and the NYSE are not fairly attributable to the government unless 
they carry the force of federal law.”); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae North American 
Securities Administrators Association, Inc. at 16, Koruga (No. 00-1415 MA). 
 220. See Brief of Amicus Curiae North American Securities Administrators 
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conflict with these rules; the rules set SRO minimum standards for 
participation in the securities markets, but there is no reason to suppose that 
Congress or the states cannot create higher standards.221  In fact, the 1998 
SEC-approved amendments to NYSE Rule 382 and NASD Rule 3230 state 
that the rule changes are not intended to affect any “liabilities under law.”222 
The 1933 and 1934 Acts explicitly preserve state causes of action.223  
State blue sky laws had existed for many years prior to the 1933 and 
1934 Acts.224  Although the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1998 preempts some state causes of action, it applies to class actions 
and not to those suing in an individual capacity.225  By limiting the 
preemption of state antifraud laws to securities class actions, Congress 
has continued to make state blue sky and common law causes of action 
available to individual investors.226 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Koruga award demonstrates the potential power of state law in 
establishing secondary liability for clearing firms.  A careful reading of 
the Uniform Act shows that clearing firms may be liable for the fraud of 
introducing firms under some circumstances.  Consistent application of 
state law, as it presently exists in states adopting the antifraud provisions 
of the Uniform Act, provides a means for extending secondary liability 
to clearing firms for the fraud of introducing firms. 
Liability under the Uniform Act does not impose too heavy a duty on 
clearing firms.  If a clearing firm had no knowledge of the fraud and 
follows the regulations imposed by applicable SROs and the SEC, that 
firm should not be liable.  All that is required under these circumstances is 
the normal monitoring procedures that should be in place in all clearing 
 
Association, Inc. at 16 (No. 00-1415 MA). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See NASD Notice to Members No. 99-57, at 1 (July 19, 1999), 
http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/9957ntm.txt; Brief of Amicus Curiae North American 
Securities Administrators Association, Inc. at 20, Koruga v. Fiserv Correspondent Servs., 
183 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Or. 2001) (No. 00-1415 MA) (citing Proposed Rule Change by 
NYSE, File No. SR-NYSE-97-25, at 7–8 (Nov. 25, 1998)). 
 223. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000) (stating the rule under the 1933 Act) (“[T]he rights and 
remedies provided by this [Act] shall be in addition to any and all other rights and 
remedies that may exist at law or in equity.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000) (stating the 
rule under the 1934 Act) (“[T]he rights and remedies provided by this [Act] shall be in 
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity.”). 
 224. For a history of the development of blue sky laws, see I LOSS & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 9, at 31–43. 
 225. 15 U.S.C. § 77p. 
 226. For a discussion of legislative history preserving private individual causes of 
action, see Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of 
State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (1998). 
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firms.  However, in cases like the Duke & Company and A.R. Baron 
frauds, where the clearing firms were found to have actual knowledge of 
the fraud, the firm would be liable to the defrauded investor. 
Clearing firms argue that the imposition of liability will drastically 
increase the costs of clearing and put smaller introducing firms out of 
business.  However, under the interpretation of the Uniform Act 
explored above, clearing firms would not be required to have in place 
any additional monitoring procedures beyond those required by their 
SROs and the SEC.  They simply would not be allowed to profit from 
the fraud of introducing firms once they know of the fraud, or benefit 
from failing to follow those regulations, which are often designed 
specifically to prevent fraud.  Any profits received in this manner are 
illegitimate in any case, and it can hardly be argued that preventing 
clearing firms from realizing them increases their costs. 
Although existing liability under state law may not go far enough for 
some and will not help residents of those states where liability follows 
federal law, victims of fraud in Uniform Act states may be able to obtain 
some relief by focusing on state law.  Existing state law as constructed 
under the Uniform Act does not leave clearing firms open to liability for 
all activities of an introducing firm, nor should it.  It does, however, 
provide for potential liability when clearing firms provide knowing 
assistance to introducing firms that are committing fraud. 
Clearing firms are in an ideal position to prevent fraud.  Smaller 
brokerage firms require their services.  Clearing firms provide access to 
the securities markets for these firms.  They also come to know the 
business of the firm through day-to-day interaction.  By making it 
expensive for clearing firms to continue to clear for introducing firms 
engaged in fraud, they are prevented from profiting from defrauded 
investors.  By preventing introducing firms engaged in fraud from having 
access to securities markets, we provide a powerful means of controlling 
fraud.  Civil liability of this type puts pressure on clearing firms to be 
more selective in their choice of customers and makes it more costly for 






FINALFILIPPONE.DOC 2/3/2020  2:22 PM 
 
1362 
 
